Is Anyone Surprised That Happened?

On February 29^th North Korea announced it would suspend nuclear weapons tests and uranium enrichment, as well as allow inspectors to monitor its main nuclear facility.  In turn United States agreed to give the county tons of desperately needed food aid.

Approximately one minute after its Friday the 13^th launch, North Korea’s Kwangmyongsong (Bright Shining Light) exploded, with debris falling back to earth and landing in the Yellow Sea.  Amidst the post-launch hype of North Korea’s failed “weather satellite” the United States announced it will suspend food aid shipments and Russia, China, and India agreed that the attempted launch violated UNSC sanctions.  Of course South Korea and Japan haven’t missed the opportunity to condemn North Korea for spending hundreds of millions of dollars developing this rocket while its citizens are impoverished and malnourished.

But was anyone really expecting this latest kerfuffle to play out any differently?  This was North Korea’s 3^rd failed “satellite” launch, though it is the first they have admitted to the North Korean public.  (North Koreans are told that the other two satellites were launched into space and are broadcasting songs and information to the rest of the world.)  North Korea has also preformed two nuclear weapons tests in 2006 and 2009, and numerous long range missile tests.  All of these are in violation of UNSC sanctions and prompted condemnation and the freezing of foreign aid. 

Every time the North Korean government has suckered the international community into sending them food aid, they have subsequently reneged on their side of the deal or otherwise violated international sanctions, prompting foreign aid to freeze. 

The Cartoon of the Week for April 13, 2012 sums my sentiments up pretty well, or at least the look on the face of the reporter in the bottom right of the image. 

Why Do We Keep Setting Ourselves Up For Disappointment?

This time I believe it was primarily because this was the first such agreement with North Korea under the rule of Kim Jong-Un.  International leaders simply couldn’t refuse the chance to kick the tires on the new leader, hoping that his upbringing in Switzerland, as opposed to in North Korea under his father, would mean the apple did in fact fall very far from the tree.  Hindsight being 20/20, that wishful thinking proved nothing more than a dream. 

Is There a Right Answer?

Two years from now when North Korea comes back to the table promising to freeze its nuclear weapons program and stop testing missiles in exchange for food aid, what should we do?  Should we refuse, knowing they weren’t going to hold up their end anyway?   Or should we agree, and console ourselves with the fact that we saved thousands of North Koreans from starvation. 

By agreeing to North Korea’s deals we are continuing down the same path of appeasement, which has proven useless in persuading North Korean leaders to abandon their nuclear weapon and missile programs.  Unfortunately the facts on the ground mean refusing to send North Korea food aid will result in North Korean children going hungry, and dying from starvation. 

Clearly the root problem is North Korean leadership, which would rather spend $200 million on a missile instead of spending the money on planting crops.  But sanctions with proving ineffective at influencing North Korean policies, what other options are there for the world to exert soft power over North Korean leadership? 

Again, the reality of the situation is that while North Korea has nuclear weapons pointed at Seoul and Tokyo there is little the world can do to strong arm Pyongyang, worst of all, they know that.   

'Outstanding Leader' and the Future of North Korea

When I started this blog I kidded to myself that it would be less than a month before something happened in North Korea that would prompt me to write a post.  I did not anticipate that it would be the death of ‘dear leader’ Kim Jong-Il.  What is clear is the chips are up in the air.  Little is known about the inner workings of Pyongyang and the personalities of the officials at the top.  In reacting to these recent events it is important to analyze a single action as possibly being caused by one or more of several causes.  This process would be shown clearest with a large tree diagram on a white board, but I am limited by my media so a blog post will have to suffice.

To start, there are several key differences between the upbringing of ‘outstanding leader’ Kim Jong-Un and his father.  Most notably is that Kim Jong-Un was educated in Switzerland, giving him firsthand experience living and functioning in a Western society.  Kim Jong-Il and Il-Sung were educated in North Korea. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/who-is-kim-jong-un-really/2011/12/20/gIQAaytB7O_story_1.html

Also important is that Kim Jong-Il spent 10 years working his way up the North Korean political and military ladder under the guidance of his father Kim Il-Sung.  Jong-Un only appeared in North Korean politics just over a year ago. 

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/03/17/2010031700811.html

A second factor to take note of is the transformation of the North Korean political structure.  Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il ruled the country as dictators, yet in his final months Kim Jong-Il made preparations to create a collective rule.  This Politburo will be composed of Jung-Un, his uncle Jang Song-Taek, and representatives of the military.   

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/us-korea-north-exclusive-idUSTRE7BK0FX20111221

The extent to which differences in their respective upbringings will differentiate son from father are as much a political debt as it is question of nature versus nurture.  I am not a biologist or developmental psychologist, but I believe differences as major as these will surely shape Kim Jong-Un into a different, even if only slightly, man than his father.  Given how Kim Jong-Il managed his country and conducted foreign policy I believe it is fair to say most world leaders would be willing to roll the dice and hope Kim Jong-Un is warmer to the World and kinder to his people than his father and grandfather before him. 

There are two possible motivations for the new North Korean political structure.  The first is that Kim Jong-Il decided the new political structure would better serve the needs of the North Korean people.  This is clearly disproved by the nature of Jong-Il’s rule.  I don’t believe it is necessary to go into further detail on this point. 

Rather than being motivated by genuine concern for the welfare of the North Korean people, I believe Kim Jong-Il was not confident his son could effectively maintain and exercise authority over the military and Nation as a whole.  With this end game in mind, there are three possible reasons for the new political order: 

1.      Despite its public support for the new leader, the military was reluctant to accept the untested 20-something as supreme commander.  This situation would mean the implementation of the Politburo was designed as a means of power sharing to buy the loyalty of the military.

2.      Kim Jong-Un is too inexperienced to rule the country effectively himself.  This would mean the Politburo was set up to help the young Kim manage the affairs of state.

3.      Kim Jong-Il feared that his brother-in-law Jang Song-Taek would try to take power from, or influence the decisions of, Jong-Un.  In this case the Politburo would ensure Kim Jong-Un a degree of authority with less resist of being undermined or removed from power.    

If my first theory is the case and top North Korean military officials were reluctant to accept the authority of Kim Jong-Un, their relationship will likely come to a flashpoint before it solidifies.  Kim Jong-Il spent ten years earning the respect of the North Korean brass before he assumed authority over them.  Jong-Un was promoted straight to the rank of 4-star general in September of 2010, prior to which he held no offices or titles.  It is expecting a lot to expect generals who fought together in the Korean War to pledge allegiance to someone so young. 

This is made unlikely due to the continued prominence of Jang Song-Taek, who was second in command behind Kim Jong-Il.  Any military official with hesitations about the ‘outstanding leader’ would likely take comfort in the presence of Song-Taek, or fear taking action against the young Kim for the same reason.  

If theory two is correct than the Politburo was established to ensure the capacity of the Government to exercise authority.  As was mentioned earlier, Jong-Un has barely one year of experience in North Korean politics.  It is logical that there is a long learning curve for politics in Pyongyang.  Therefore it is plausible that Kim Jong-Il established the Politburo to mentor his son and show him the ropes of dictating.  This would allow Kim Jong-Un to learn how to conduct North Korean politics.  While the Politburo could have been an unofficial or shadow organization, if it was discovered it would discredit the authority Kim Jong-Un. 

In the case of the third theory being true, Kim Jong-Il established the Politburo to protect his son’s rule from Jang Song-Taek.  Until 2004 many suspected that Jang might succeed Kim Jong-Il, however he disappeared from late 2004 to March 2006, when he was seen again with his brother-in-law on a trip to China.  Kim Jong-Il may have feared that his brother-in-law would try to seize power from Kim Jong-Un, or manipulate his nephew from behind the throne. 

In essence, each of these justifications supports the conclusion that Kim Jong-Il sought to ensure North Korea was managed much the same way as it has been for fifty years.  The trick is determining the factors that provoked Kim Jong-Il into implementing this radical change to the North Korean government. 

Determining how an individual or government will act is one of the most difficult tasks in politics.  This is only made more difficult when the entity being analyzed doesn’t view the world with the same ideology or from the same position.  Consider the secrecy with which North Korea conducts its affairs and it will be very difficult to anticipate how North Korea will act.  Add to this the new political structure, and the best that can be done is view each action as the result of several possible causes.  Only then can an educated analysis of North Korean policies be made and their policy actions anticipated.